damage and recovery'. The NRP is a detailed document that discusses likely terrorist attacks and natural disasters and ways in which the nation would respond. One of these scenarios is a major hurricane. 3 The CIS is a detailed operations plan (OPLAN) and execution matrix that describes in detail the actions to be taken, by function and agency, by the hour as the catastrophic incident (CI) occurs. 4 However, in all of this detail, none of these documents answer the question of who is in charge of the response efforts for a CI. All agree that response and initial responsibility is always at the lowest level but nothing addresses the command relationship once federal agencies become involved to take on a large part of the response effort. Current Homeland Security policy states that in the event of a national disaster, or 'incident of national significance', the federal Department of Homeland Security, under the direction of the President, is responsible for providing a unified command structure with a single federal coordinator managing the response effort at the site. 5 However, when considering state sovereignty this national policy becomes problematic, confusing, and contentious. In view of the chaos that followed Katrina and lack of any immediate unity of command, it is time for a policy assessment of who should be in charge of response efforts following CIs.
This paper presents three courses of action (COAs) in an attempt to answer the question of command and control of catastrophic incidents. The first COA is to retain the status quo of the states in the lead role with federal agencies such as the DHS and the DOD providing support when, and where, requested. Currently, the DHS has the federal lead in providing support to the states. However, circumstances may arise where local and state agencies become overwhelmed and the President may direct the DHS or the DOD to assume the lead.
The second course of action is one in which DHS has the lead from the beginning with states providing the usual first responder support but subordinate to the direction of DHS/FEMA directives. This takes away much of the states powers and gives more authority to federal agencies, especially the DHS and its subordinate FEMA. The third scenario is one in which the DOD assumes the lead role for disaster response. This is similar to COA 2 except the lead is the DOD not the DHS.
A discussion of each course of action will consider the strengths and weaknesses of each and consider which best meets the standards of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.
Feasibility is defined as a COA that accomplishes the mission within constraints such as available resources and time available. An acceptable COA is one which is proportional in the sense that costs are worth the advantages gained. Suitable COAs accomplish the mission and are in compliance with the guidance or intent. 6 After exploration of the three COAs, a recommendation and a way ahead for this current problem will be presented. Federal oversight can set and enforce national standards for first responders and state capabilities and enforce compliance by tying it to funding.
Finally, it is questionable whether the federal government can afford to lose the capability that the NG provides by fencing off a portion of the force for state and regional missions only.
Without their contributions in the GWOT it would place an even greater burden on already overtaxed reserve and active component force. More research must be done in this area to see how this affects our national military strategy. One way to offset the isolation of NG troops for a specific role in CI response would be to build their skill sets in this area. This would be fairly easy for many of the forces as they could draw from the communities in which they reside and spend most of their time in. To ensure these skills are retained a mandatory bi-annual certification of critical CI skills might help in bridging the gap between current and future roles of the NG. There were many successes in spite of all that went wrong in the Katrina response.
Hundreds of thousands of residents were evacuated before the storm hit land; thousands more were rescued during and after the storm under extremely difficult conditions including over 33,000 by the DHS's Coast Guard alone. 14 DHS coordination with DOD resulted in the armed forces providing food, water, medical aid, and assistance in restoring order. All of this was accomplished on a magnitude of catastrophe never before experienced by our nation and was indicative of our government's ability to respond and the heroic efforts of individuals and agencies at all levels. Based on this success and the organizational framework noted below the DHS is well-postured to be the lead agency in response to CIs across the nation. The main opposition to this COA, like COA 2 , is that it is a threat to state's rights. Under current law state governors have command and control of response to disasters. Governors have the power to deploy their National Guard and it is assumed that should federal assistance be provided it would be in a supporting role. 21 From the view of local and state representatives, the military is meant to prepare for and win the nation's wars, not to serve as a first responder to state emergencies. There is also valid concern over whether the military can take on this additional mission when it is already strained in all components in fighting the GWOT resulting in multiple deployments and recruiting and retention shortfalls. The DOD is also sensitive to the idea of using federal troops in a domestic police role. 22 Opponents also argue whether the nation can afford to reserve special units in anticipation of a disaster to occur. The first responders are already in place and train for and react to disasters routinely. Finally, proponents of COA 2 (DHS lead) claim that this action is unnecessary as there already is a good working relationship between DOD and DHS that facilitates planning and rapid response through the placement of DOD liaisons in key DHS offices to include the HSOC. 23 Discussion and Recommendation: Recommend COA 1-Retain Status Quo with states in lead supported by DHS with additional changes to existing procedures.
COA 1 provides a feasible and suitable solution to our current problem of leadership in national emergencies. States can't go it alone and need resource assistance from the federal government. The DHS must reorganize in accordance with Secretary Chertoff's plan to be better postured to assume the lead should states become overwhelmed. Following these modifications this is an acceptable COA with minimum cost.
COA 2 calls for consolidation of command and control in the DHS for national disasters. It is a suitable plan that improves the ability of the DHS to lead national efforts in CI management.
It is an acceptable approach and should result in less bureauracracy, a more effective FEMA, and over time, better integration of all levels of response. However, this COA is not feasible in that it would face stiff resistance from states and Congress based on concerns that it violates state's rights in many areas and would be difficult in implementation.
COA 3 assigns the lead role to the Department of Defense. This is certainly suitable in that it does accomplish the intent of more focused command and control of CI response.
However, it is doubtful that it is worth the military costs incurred to add this mission to an already over-stretched DOD given OPTEMPO and competing requirements already on the force structure. Also like COA 2, COA 3 violates states rights and brings into question the proper roles of our federal forces. This COA is therefore not feasible or acceptable.
Although all three COAs are suitable in meeting the three stated objectives of the NSHS, the most feasible and acceptable COA is COA 1 given the re-organization of DHS as proposed by Secretary Chertoff, it strengthens the ability of FEMA to provide assistance to states, it preserves state sovereignty, and it has widespread acceptance as the best solution to lead the nation's response to catastrophic incidents. In addition, with reorganization well underway the answer to the question of command, control, and coordination of catastrophic incident response becomes clearer. Based on the framework with states in the lead of internal incidents, they Clearly these are not the priority areas we ought to be focusing our efforts and resources on in the name of Homeland Security.
Rather than tying HS funding to other bills and ending up with results such as discussed above the funding should be tied to a risk-based formula with the federal dollars prioritized to those areas most likely to be targeted by terrorists. The 9-11 Commission findings report that "Congress has still not changed the underlying statutory authority for homeland security grants .
. . to ensure that funds are used wisely. As a result, homeland security funds continue to be distributed without regard for risk, vulnerability, or the consequences of an attack." 26 Effective immediately the government should allocate homeland security monies based on nationwide vulnerability assessments. Although all states are arguably in need, the majority of funding should be awarded to those areas that pose the greatest risk to terrorist attacks (like the port of New York and New Jersey), are the most vulnerable, and afford the enemy the highest payoff.
This procedure must also integrate assessments of important areas (like New Orleans) that may not necessarily be a high priority terrorist target but are a great risk from natural disasters. So, areas highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks are probably prioritized slightly higher than those simply at risk of a natural disaster. The Commission found that in the area of critical infrastructure risk and vulnerability assessment, no assessments had been conducted, no priorities had been set, and no recommendations have been made to allocate resources in spite of an existing (draft) National Infrastructure Protection Plan that includes standards and guidance for the conduct of vulnerability assessments. responsibilities of responders at all levels of government, and improved resource accountability and allocation processes tied to vulnerability assessments and on levels of risk, based on nonpartisan vulnerability assessment teams, significant progress is being made. Improvements are continuously being made in this system. In order to get better accountability of allocation of homeland security funding to localities these funds could be instead granted to regional or state operations centers and they would in turn award the funds based on regional assessments of risk.
Finally, a very important area is the private sector and the steps it must take in preparation and response to catastrophic incidents. Everyone, from private citizens to corporate America, have a role in how the neighborhoods and the nation prepares for and responds to crisis.
Across America this is evident with the organization of citizen first-responder groups and in corporate America with organizations such as ProtectingAmerica. This is a national organization headed by former FEMA Director James Lee Witt and former Deputy Director of the DHS Admiral James Loy. Its purpose is to support regional, state, and local efforts to better prepare and respond to catastrophic events. This organization also is working hard to bring about a National Catastrophe Insurance Program to provide financial protection to citizens as well. 29 The nation continues to make progress at all levels every day. However, Congress must not tie the accomplishment of critical measures of homeland security to partisan pork-barrel politics. Every minute we spend wrangling over how to fund and improve our homeland security is time gained by the enemy in preparation for his next attack. The time to act is now; we are moving but must move faster and more effectively.
All of the actions above are critical in moving the nation forward in preparation for the next catastrophic incident. Rapid, effective, and seamless response begins with unity and clarity of command and control. Leaving the states in charge of their own response efforts with support from regional and national agencies provides the most feasible course of action to ensure our communities and our nation is prepared for the next Katrina.
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